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First published on May 13, 2008, doi:10.1177/0022002708316742
Journal of Conflict Resolution 2008;52:548.
A more recent version of this article appeared on August 1, 2008
Humanitarian Relief and Civil Conflict
Max Blouin*
and
Stéphane Pallage
CIRPEE and Department of Economics, Université du Québec à Montréal, Canada
* To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: blouin.max{at}uqam.ca.
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Abstract |
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The authors examine the effects that famine relief efforts (food aid) can have in regions undergoing civil war. In the model, warlords seize a fraction of all aid entering the region. How much they can loot affects their choice of army size; therefore the manner in which aid is delivered influences warfare. The authors identify a delivery plan for aid that minimizes total recruitment in equilibrium.

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