This Article Full Text (OnlineFirst PDF) All Versions of this Article: 0022002709338509v1 53/6/827    most recent Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via Scopus Google Scholar Articles by Gaibulloev, K. Articles by Shimizu, H. Social Bookmarking                         What's this?

Demands for UN and non-UN Peacekeeping: Nonvoluntary versus Voluntary Contributions to a Public Good

¹ School of Economic, Political, & Policy Sciences, University of Texas at Dallas
² School of Economic, Political, & Policy Science, University of Texas at Dallas
³ Department of Public Policy, National Defense Academy, Yokosuka-shi, Japan

^* To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: tsandler{at}utdallas.edu.

	Abstract

This article presents alternative estimates for the demand for UN and non-UN peacekeeping. Generally, three-way fixed-effects models, which account for the country, year, and conflict region, provide the best estimates. The demand for UN peacekeeping is primarily influenced by the contributions of other nations (i.e., spillins), with spillin elasticity not significantly different from 1. For non-UN peacekeeping, both spillins and country-specific interests in the conflict region influence contributions. These peacekeepers’ interests include trade and FDI concerns, along with proximity to the conflict. Peacekeeping missions appear partitioned: UN missions for global public benefits and non-UN missions for peacekeeper-specific benefits.

First published on July 29, 2009, doi:10.1177/0022002709338509

Journal of Conflict Resolution 2009;53:827.

A more recent version of this article appeared on December 1, 2009


CiteULike    Complore    Connotea    Del.icio.us    Digg    Reddit    Technorati    Twitter    What's this?