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Journal of Conflict Resolution
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An Application of a Richardson Process Model

Soviet-Amer.Can Interactions in the Test Ban Negotiations 1962-1963

P. Terrence Hopmann

Department of Political Science and Quigley Center of International Studies University of Minnesota

Theresa C. Smith

Department of Political Science and Quigley Center of International Studies University of Minnesota

Richardson models have often been used to describe reactive processes in arms races. This paper argues that, following the work of Otomar Bartos, negotiations may also be analyzed as a reactive process rather than as a process of discrete position changes. Four variants of the basic Richardson model were employed to determine whether the Partial Test Ban negotiations exhibited such an interactive pattern. In all four equations for the behavior of both the United States and the USSR the stimulus variable provided the greatest explanatory power, supporting the notion that these negotiations were reactive. Several important differences emerged, however, between the Test Ban negotiations and most arms races. On balance, the data gave strong support for the basic assumption of Richardson models, namely that negotiations may be treated as a highly reactive process.

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 21, No. 4, 701-726 (1977)
DOI: 10.1177/002200277702100409


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