Advanced Search

Journal Navigation

Journal Home

Subscriptions

Archive

Contact Us

Table of Contents

Click here to sign up for SAGE Journal Email Alerts today!

Sign In to gain access to subscriptions and/or personal tools.
Journal of Conflict Resolution
This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow References
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to Saved Citations
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Right arrow Request Reprints
Right arrow Add to My Marked Citations
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via HighWire
Right arrow Citing Articles via Google Scholar
Right arrow Citing Articles via Scopus
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Jones, P. R.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike   Add to Complore   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us   Add to Digg   Add to Reddit   Add to Technorati   Add to Twitter  
What's this?

Defense Alliances and International Trade

Philip R. Jones

School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Bath, England

The objective of this note is to illustrate the impact of defense alliances on international arms trade. By differentiating between the income and price effects that are associated with the formation of international alliances, it is possible to consider the involvement of alliance member countries in international arms trade. The availability of a world market for armaments enables alliance members to encash the spillover benefits created by alliance formation. When alliance members make a significant contribution to world trade, the impact upon the international terms of trade affects the gains from membership. Should allied countries engage in trade management, they may affect the distribution of such membership benefits. An analysis of interalliance trade in armaments suggests a distinction between world efficiency and alliance efficiency. Allied countries exporting armaments may have an incentive to trade with other allies at a reduced price rather than trade with the rest of the world.

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 32, No. 1, 123-140 (1988)
DOI: 10.1177/0022002788032001006
Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Complore Complore   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us   Add to Digg Digg   Add to Reddit Reddit   Add to Technorati Technorati   Add to Twitter Twitter    What's this?


This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
 Journal of Conflict ResolutionHome page
T. Sandler
The Economic Theory of Alliances: A Survey
Journal of Conflict Resolution, September 1, 1993; 37(3): 446 - 483.
[Abstract]