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Richardson, Rationality, and Restrictive Models of Arms Races

Indiana University

Richardson's simple arms race model inspired an extensive (and still growing) body of research by scholars in many disciplines. Unfortunately, much of this work follows Richardson's lead by paying scant attention to domestic politics and decision-making processes. Despite the use of increasingly sophisticated formal models, empirical measures, and statistical methods, progress has been stymied by continued reliance on rigid models and literal interpretations of statistical tests, especially regarding the relative potency of external and internal factors. A new approach to modeling is required if we are to understand the underlying dynamics of resource allocation that sustain an arms race. The author argues that the substantive complexities of arms rivalries can be implicitly encompassed by simple rational models considerably less restrictive than Richardson's model.

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 35, No. 3, 443-473 (1991)
DOI: 10.1177/0022002791035003003


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