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The Role of Communication in Interindividual-Intergroup Discontinuity

John Schopler

Stephen M. Drigotas

Kenneth A. Graetz

James Kennedy

Chante Cox

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Garry Bornstein

Hebrew University of Jerusalem

The present research was designed to explore the role of communication on interindividual-intergroup discontinuity in the context of the PDG-Alt matrix. (The PDG-Alt matrix is a prisoner's dilemma game matrix that adds a third withdrawal choice to the usual cooperative and uncooperative choices of the PDG matrix, and interindividual-intergroup discontinuity is the tendency of intergroup relations to be more competitive and less cooperative than interindividual relations.) Several predictions implied by the fear and greed explanations of interindividual-intergroup discontinuity were tested. One prediction, an implication of the fear hypothesis, is that communication should produce a larger increase in the cooperation of individuals than of groups. This prediction is based partially on the assumption that the outgroup schema, which leads to more fear of groups than of individuals, should reduce the credibility of between group communication. Given, however, that without communication individuals may not cooperate, what will they do? Will they withdraw or will they compete? Another prediction, an implication of the greed hypothesis, is that the absence of communication should result in a greater increase in withdrawal for individuals than for groups. This prediction is based partially on the assumption that the social support provided to fellow group members for self-interested competitiveness is absent for individuals. These predictions were confirmed. It was argued that the lesser tendency of individuals to cooperate when there is no communication with the opponent may explain partially the differing results of past discontinuity research (which has involved communication) and research reported in the PDG literature (which typically has not involved communication).

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 37, No. 1, 108-138 (1993)
DOI: 10.1177/0022002793037001005


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