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Presidents, the Use of Military Force, and Public Opinion
Bradley Lian
John R. Oneal
University of Alabama
It is conventional wisdom that the public rallies 'round the president when military force is used abroad. Indeed, this belief has encouraged the view that presidents are apt to rattle the saber to divert attention from domestic problems. The rally effect is assessed by measuring the change in the president's popularity following all major uses of force by the United States from 1950 through 1984. Surprisingly, for these 102 cases, the mean change in the president's approval rating is 0%, even among the members of his party. Even well-publicized uses of force during a crisis boost the president's standing only 2%-3% on average. Regression analyses confirm that the rallying effect of a use of force is greater in a crisis and when the action is prominently reported by the media. In addition, rallies are greater when the president enjoys bipartisan support, his initial popularity is low, and the country is not at war or fatigued by war.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 37, No. 2,
277-300 (1993)
DOI: 10.1177/0022002793037002003

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