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Journal of Conflict Resolution
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Influences on the Duration of Wars, Strikes, Riots, and Family Arguments

Samuel Vuchinich

Oregon State University

Jay Teachman

University of Maryland

Utility theory has been frequently applied in the analyses of the outbreak of war. The present study extends the application of utility theory to conflict duration. The authors consider how the perceived utility of continuing conflict changes while conflicts are under way, and posit that conflicts end when the utility of continuing is less than the utility of surrender. Predictions developed from the theory are tested, using hazard models, on duration data from actual wars, strikes, riots, and family arguments. Consistent with utility theory, the likelihood of wars and strikes ending is found to decrease while they are under way, exhibiting a tendency for these conflicts to become entrenched. In sharp contrast to this, but consistent with utility theory, riots and family arguments are more likely to end the longer they last. Size of conflict and dispute issue are shown to effect duration in some circumstances. The results offer a way of explaining how conflicts between "rational" organizations become entrenched and resistant to resolution. Implications for efforts to reduce conflict duration are discussed.

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 37, No. 3, 544-568 (1993)
DOI: 10.1177/0022002793037003007


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