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Journal of Conflict Resolution
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Integrative Complexity and British Decisions during the Munich and Polish Crises

Stephen G. Walker

George L. Watson

Arizona State University

This study addresses the impact of crisis management strategies, stress, and groupthink conditions on the integrative complexity of British decision makers in 10 decision-making episodes during two Anglo-German crises in 1938 and 1939. A systematic random sample of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's statements during British cabinet deliberations in the intragovernmental arena and British messages to Germany in the intergovernmental arena during the acute phase of each crisis was scored for integrative complexity. An ANOVA of integrative complexity for crisis, arena, and episode demonstrated a significant independent relationship between strategy and integrative complexity plus a significant interaction effect between strategy and arena on integrative complexity. There were also significant differences in Chamberlain's integrative complexity between early and later episodes of the Polish conflict in the intragovernmental arena; no significant differences occurred between episodes in either arena during the Munich conflict. These results support the hypotheses that associate low integrative complexity with the implementation of a competitive strategy in the intergovernmental arena and with high stress in the intragovernmental arena.

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 38, No. 1, 3-23 (1994)
DOI: 10.1177/0022002794038001001


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