This Article Full Text (PDF) References Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Citation Map Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via HighWire Citing Articles via Google Scholar Citing Articles via Scopus Google Scholar Articles by Saijo, T. Articles by Nakamura, H. Search for Related Content Social Bookmarking                         What's this?

The "Spite" Dilemma in Voluntary Contribution Mechanism Experiments

University of Tsukuba, Osaka University

Hideki Nakamura

Fukushima University

This article explains deviations from formal expectations regarding choice behavior in settings where economic rationality (i.e., own payoff maximization) dictates either cooperating (full contribution) or free riding (no contribution) in the provision of public goods via the voluntary contribution mechanism. The authors find that the difference between full contribution and the observed level of contribution is greater than or equal to the corresponding difference when free riding is the best strategy. This surprising result is interpreted as the "spiteful" behavior of subjects whose first priority is not the total amount of payoff they receive but the ranking among them.

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 39, No. 3, 535-560 (1995)
DOI: 10.1177/0022002795039003007


CiteULike    Complore    Connotea    Del.icio.us    Digg    Reddit    Technorati    Twitter    What's this?

This article has been cited by other articles:

				E. Reuben and A. Riedl Public Goods Provision and Sanctioning in Privileged Groups Journal of Conflict Resolution, February 1, 2009; 53(1): 72 - 93. [Abstract] [PDF]

				J. C. Cox and V. Sadiraj On Modeling Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods Public Finance Review, March 1, 2007; 35(2): 311 - 332. [Abstract] [PDF]

				U. Cress, J. Kimmerle, and F. W. Hesse Information Exchange With Shared Databases as a Social Dilemma: The Effect of Metaknowledge, Bonus Systems, and Costs Communication Research, October 1, 2006; 33(5): 370 - 390. [Abstract] [PDF]

				J. Bednar Is Full Compliance Possible?: Conditions for Shirking with Imperfect Monitoring and Continuous Action Spaces Journal of Theoretical Politics, July 1, 2006; 18(3): 347 - 375. [Abstract] [PDF]