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Extraction, Allocation, and the Rise and Decline of States

A Simulation Analysis of Two-Level Security Management

Bowling Green State University

Harvey Starr

University of South Carolina

Using realist models of international politics that deemphasize the two-level security game that states play, most analyses of hegemonic decline argue that decline is caused by the differential growth of power between hegemons and challenging states. The authors argue that decline is affected highly by states' resource extraction and allocation decisions, and that the international and domestic consequences of these decisions must be analyzed. A model of how states respond to external and internal security threats is outlined and analyzed via computer simulation. The authors find that states are likely to decline if they overemphasize increasing capabilities to deter threats instead of allocating resources to reduce opponents' willingness to attack. In addition, a more "dovish" allocation strategy can be very effective against internal threats. Thus the decline of hegemons and rise of challengers is determined as much by strategies as by constraints posed by the system structure.

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 40, No. 2, 272-297 (1996)
DOI: 10.1177/0022002796040002003


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