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Maintaining System Stability

Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations

Department of Political Science, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh

Mark A. Boyer

Department of Political Science, University of Connecticut

This article examines the ways and degrees to which nation-states participate in and financially support United Nations peacekeeping operations (UN PKOs). The authors contend that UN PKOs are impure public goods whose provision conforms to expectations from public goods theory that deals with the provision of impure public goods and club goods, and much less to the hegemonic stability variant of the public goods approach. Conceptual arguments are followed by an examination of general patterns of UN PKOs, personnel and financial contributions to them, and the U.S. role in them. The authors conclude that the post-cold war period has seen a notable increase in the volume of provision of peacekeeping and in the quantity and diversity of contributors and beneficiaries. They recognize the difficulties posed by recent U.S. nonpayments and suggest the possibility of adjustments that will reestablish the financial basis that continuing substantial provision will require.

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 41, No. 6, 723-748 (1997)
DOI: 10.1177/0022002797041006001


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