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Journal of Conflict Resolution
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A Cross-Cultural Exploration of the Reference Dependence of Crucial Group Decisions under Risk

Japan's 1941 Decision for War

Ariel S. Levi

Department of Management, Wayne State University

Glen Whyte

Faculty of Management, University of Toronto

This study investigates risky group decision making in Japan from a prospect theory perspective. Hypotheses concerning the effects of the reference point on risk preferences in group decision making were tested by content analyzing transcripts of Japanese leaders' deliberations prior to their 1941 decision for war and subsequent attack on Pearl Harbor. Consistent with prospect theory, the results show systematic associations between the reference point used and the riskiness of policy recommendations. The highly risky decision for war appears to have been influenced by the group's reference point, which framed the group's alternatives as a choice between losses. The decision for war thus appears to have been motivated by a desire to avoid what were otherwise perceived as certain losses.

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 41, No. 6, 792-813 (1997)
DOI: 10.1177/0022002797041006004
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