This Article Full Text (PDF) References Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Citation Map Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via Google Scholar Citing Articles via Scopus Google Scholar Articles by Michener, H. A. Articles by Myers, D. J. Search for Related Content Social Bookmarking                         What's this?

Probabilistic Coalition Structure Theories

An Empirical Comparison in Four-Person Superadditive Sidepayment Games

Department of Sociology, University of Wisconsin-Madison

Daniel J. Myers

Department of Sociology, University of Notre Dame

This article reports a comparative test of the central-union theory in four-person sidepayment games. Predictions by two variants of central-union theory (CU-1 and CU-2) are tested vis-à-vis predictions by three other solutions (the equal excess model, the Myerson-Shapley solution, and the kernel). With respect to players' payoffs, results show that CU-1, CU-2, equal excess, and Myerson-Shapley models have essentially equal predictive accuracy and that all of these are superior to the kernel in the test games. However, when coalition structure probability predictions are incorporated in the test, both CU-1 and CU-2 emerge as more accurate than all the other models tested.

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 42, No. 6, 830-860 (1998)
DOI: 10.1177/0022002798042006007


CiteULike    Complore    Connotea    Del.icio.us    Digg    Reddit    Technorati    Twitter    What's this?