This Article Full Text (PDF) References Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Citation Map Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via HighWire Citing Articles via Google Scholar Citing Articles via Scopus Google Scholar Articles by Ireland, M. J. Articles by Gartner, S. S. Search for Related Content Social Bookmarking                         What's this?

Time to Fight

Government Type and Conflict Initiation in Parliamentary Systems

Scott Sigmund Gartner

Department of Political Science, University of California, Davis

Democratic peace arguments make compelling claims about the importance of regime type for explaining conflict but do not explain the variation in conflict propensity among states that share a common regime type. The authors develop a veto-player approach to capture the effects of executive constraint and argue that in parliamentary democracies, cabinet structure and allies influence states' conflict behavior. A hazard analysis is used to examine the time before a government's first initiation of force in 569 cabinets in 18 countries from the end of World War I to 1990 (N = 25,238 cabinet months). Results show that minority governments have a smaller hazard for initiating a conflict than either coalition or majority cabinets. However, the likelihood of conflict initiation for coalition and majority cabinets is the same. States with allies are less likely to initiate force. Across states of relatively uniform political culture, institutional measures of constraint effectively predict variation in conflict behavior.

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 45, No. 5, 547-568 (2001)
DOI: 10.1177/0022002701045005001


CiteULike    Complore    Connotea    Del.icio.us    Digg    Reddit    Technorati    Twitter    What's this?

This article has been cited by other articles:

				M. T. Koch Governments, Partisanship, and Foreign Policy: The Case of Dispute Duration Journal of Peace Research, November 1, 2009; 46(6): 799 - 817. [Abstract] [PDF]

				D. J. Brule and L. K. Williams Democracy and Diversion: Government Arrangements, the Economy, and Dispute Initiation Journal of Peace Research, November 1, 2009; 46(6): 777 - 798. [Abstract] [PDF]

				E. A. Stanley and J. P. Sawyer The Equifinality of War Termination: Multiple Paths to Ending War Journal of Conflict Resolution, October 1, 2009; 53(5): 651 - 676. [Abstract] [PDF]

				J. W. Keller and Y. E. Yang Leadership Style, Decision Context, and the Poliheuristic Theory of Decision Making: An Experimental Analysis Journal of Conflict Resolution, October 1, 2008; 52(5): 687 - 712. [Abstract] [PDF]

				C. R. Boehmer A Reassessment of Democratic Pacifism at the Monadic Level of Analysis Conflict Management and Peace Science, February 1, 2008; 25(1): 81 - 94. [Abstract] [PDF]

				M. T. Koch and S. Cranmer Testing the "Dick Cheney" Hypothesis: Do Governments of the Left Attract More Terrorism than Governments of the Right? Conflict Management and Peace Science, September 1, 2007; 24(4): 311 - 326. [Abstract] [PDF]

				D. M. Stinnett International Uncertainty, Foreign Policy Flexibility, and Surplus Majority Coalitions in Israel Journal of Conflict Resolution, June 1, 2007; 51(3): 470 - 495. [Abstract] [PDF]

				D. Brule Congressional Opposition, the Economy, and U.S. Dispute Initiation, 1946-2000 Journal of Conflict Resolution, August 1, 2006; 50(4): 463 - 483. [Abstract] [PDF]

				M. Koch and S. S. Gartner Casualties and Constituencies: Democratic Accountability, Electoral Institutions, and Costly Conflicts Journal of Conflict Resolution, December 1, 2005; 49(6): 874 - 894. [Abstract] [PDF]

				D. Leblang and S. Chan Explaining Wars Fought by Established Democracies: Do Institutional Constraints Matter? Political Research Quarterly, December 1, 2003; 56(4): 385 - 400. [Abstract] [PDF]

				G. Chiozza and H. E. Goemans Peace through Insecurity: Tenure and International Conflict Journal of Conflict Resolution, August 1, 2003; 47(4): 443 - 467. [Abstract] [PDF]

				M. J. Lebo and W. H. Moore Dynamic Foreign Policy Behavior Journal of Conflict Resolution, February 1, 2003; 47(1): 13 - 32. [Abstract] [PDF]

				J. M. Box-Steffensmeier, D. Reiter, and C. Zorn Nonproportional Hazards and Event History Analysis in International Relations Journal of Conflict Resolution, February 1, 2003; 47(1): 33 - 53. [Abstract] [PDF]

				B. C. PRINS Institutional Instability and the Credibility of Audience Costs: Political Participation and Interstate Crisis Bargaining, 1816-1992 Journal of Peace Research, January 1, 2003; 40(1): 67 - 84. [Abstract] [PDF]