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Choice of Partners in Multiple Two-Person Prisoner's Dilemma Games

An Experimental Study

Rosemarie Nagel

Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Spain

The effect of unilateral and mutual partner selection in the context of prisoner's dilemmas is examined. Participants played simultaneously several finitely repeated, two-person prisoner's dilemma games. Results show that unilateral choice leads to lower defection and fewer exits than mutual choice. In the unilateral-choice setup, intending defectors are more likely to exit than intending cooperators. Implications of these findings in the political context are discussed.

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 45, No. 6, 770-793 (2001)
DOI: 10.1177/0022002701045006004


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