|
Sign In to gain access to subscriptions and/or personal tools.
|
Attracting Trouble
Democracy, Leadership Tenure, and the Targeting of Militarized Challenges, 1918-1992
Christopher Gelpi
Joseph M. Grieco
Department of Political Science, Duke University
Otherwise powerful, formidable democracies are tempting targets for international violence because they have leaders who, on average, have been in office for shorter periods of time than leaders of autocracies. Domestic incentives may make resistance more costly than offering concessions for inexperienced leaders of both democratic and authoritarian states. Over time, however, resistance may become domestically less costly, causing experienced leaders to be more likely to prefer resistance. Anticipating this response, potential challengers may be more likely to target inexperienced leaders. Because democracies generally have high rates of leadership turnover, they are tempting targets for international violence. Statistical analysis of crisis initiation between 1918 and 1992 confirms the perception that democracies are more likely to be targets of militarized challenges. Results are also consistent with the proposition that the relatively short tenure in office served by democratic leaders helps to account for the observed pattern of democratic attraction of foreign challenges.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 45, No. 6,
794-817 (2001)
DOI: 10.1177/0022002701045006005

CiteULike Complore Connotea Del.icio.us Digg Reddit Technorati Twitter What's this?
This article has been cited by other articles:

|
 |

|
 |
 
H. E. Goemans, K. S. Gleditsch, and G. Chiozza
Introducing Archigos: A Dataset of Political Leaders
Journal of Peace Research,
March 1, 2009;
46(2):
269 - 283.
[Abstract]
[PDF]
|
 |
|

|
 |

|
 |
 
D. Filson and S. Werner
Sensitivity to Costs of Fighting versus Sensitivity to Losing the Conflict: Implications for War Onset, Duration, and Outcomes
Journal of Conflict Resolution,
October 1, 2007;
51(5):
691 - 714.
[Abstract]
[PDF]
|
 |
|

|
 |

|
 |
 
M. T. Koch and S. Cranmer
Testing the "Dick Cheney" Hypothesis: Do Governments of the Left Attract More Terrorism than Governments of the Right?
Conflict Management and Peace Science,
September 1, 2007;
24(4):
311 - 326.
[Abstract]
[PDF]
|
 |
|

|
 |

|
 |
 
J. Pickering and E. F. Kisangani
Political, Economic, and Social Consequences of Foreign Military Intervention
Political Research Quarterly,
September 1, 2006;
59(3):
363 - 376.
[Abstract]
[PDF]
|
 |
|

|
 |

|
 |
 
K. Maeda and M. Nishikawa
Duration of Party Control in Parliamentary and Presidential Governments: A Study of 65 Democracies, 1950 to 1998
Comparative Political Studies,
April 1, 2006;
39(3):
352 - 374.
[Abstract]
[PDF]
|
 |
|

|
 |

|
 |
 
M. Horowitz, R. McDermott, and A. C. Stam
Leader Age, Regime Type, and Violent International Relations
Journal of Conflict Resolution,
October 1, 2005;
49(5):
661 - 685.
[Abstract]
[PDF]
|
 |
|

|
 |

|
 |
 
G. Chiozza and H. E. Goemans
Avoiding Diversionary Targets
Journal of Peace Research,
July 1, 2004;
41(4):
423 - 443.
[Abstract]
[PDF]
|
 |
|

|
 |

|
 |
 
G. Chiozza and H. E. Goemans
Peace through Insecurity: Tenure and International Conflict
Journal of Conflict Resolution,
August 1, 2003;
47(4):
443 - 467.
[Abstract]
[PDF]
|
 |
|

|
 |

|
 |
 
G. Chiozza and A. Choi
Guess Who Did What: Political Leaders and the Management of Territorial Disputes, 1950-1990
Journal of Conflict Resolution,
June 1, 2003;
47(3):
251 - 278.
[Abstract]
[PDF]
|
 |
|

|
 |

|
 |
 
P. K. HUTH and T. L. ALLEE
Domestic Political Accountability and the Escalation and Settlement of International Disputes
Journal of Conflict Resolution,
December 1, 2002;
46(6):
754 - 790.
[Abstract]
[PDF]
|
 |
|
|
|