Advanced Search

Journal Navigation

Journal Home

Subscriptions

Archive

Contact Us

Table of Contents

Click here to sign up for SAGE Journal Email Alerts today!

Sign In to gain access to subscriptions and/or personal tools.
Journal of Conflict Resolution
This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow Dataset
Right arrow References
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Right arrow Citation Map
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to Saved Citations
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Right arrow Request Reprints
Right arrow Add to My Marked Citations
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via HighWire
Right arrow Citing Articles via Google Scholar
Right arrow Citing Articles via Scopus
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Christensen, E. J.
Right arrow Articles by Redd, S. B.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike   Add to Complore   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us   Add to Digg   Add to Reddit   Add to Technorati   Add to Twitter  
What's this?

Bureaucrats Versus the Ballot Box in Foreign Policy Decision Making

An Experimental Analysis of the Bureaucratic Politics Model and the Poliheuristic Theory

Eben J. Christensen

Steven B. Redd

Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee

The bureaucratic politics model and the poliheuristic theory are used to examine how political advice presented in various contexts influences choice. Organizational advisers who offer endogenous political advice are compared with situations in which the decision maker is offered advice by a separate, or exogenous, political adviser. Results show that decision makers are influenced by political evaluations in a noncompensatory manner, even when this advice is endogenously presented, and that political evaluations (and foreign policy choices) can be affected by the presence of multiple bureaucratic advisers. These findings have significant implications for how information is presented in advisory group settings.

Key Words: Bureaucratic politics model • poliheuristic theory • political advice • decision making

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48, No. 1, 69-90 (2004)
DOI: 10.1177/0022002703261054
Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Complore Complore   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us   Add to Digg Digg   Add to Reddit Reddit   Add to Technorati Technorati   Add to Twitter Twitter    What's this?


This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
 Journal of Conflict ResolutionHome page
A. Mintz
How Do Leaders Make Decisions?: A Poliheuristic Perspective
Journal of Conflict Resolution, February 1, 2004; 48(1): 3 - 13.
[Abstract] [PDF]

Home page
 Journal of Conflict ResolutionHome page
A. Mintz
Foreign Policy Decision Making in Familiar and Unfamiliar Settings: An Experimental Study of High-Ranking Military Officers
Journal of Conflict Resolution, February 1, 2004; 48(1): 91 - 104.
[Abstract] [PDF]