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Journal of Conflict Resolution
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Power Cycles, Risk Propensity, and Great-Power Deterrence

Brock F. Tessman

Department of Political Science, University of Colorado

Steve Chan

Department of Political Science, University of Colorado

The theory of power cycles contends that the growth and decline of national power holds the key to understanding the occurrence of extensive wars. Certain critical points in a state’s power trajectory are especially dangerous occasions for such armed clashes. The power cycles of nine major states during the period from 1816 to 1995 are examined, and prospect theory is used to derive expectations about the risk propensity of states during different periods in their power cycle. These expectations are in turn applied to an analysis of deterrence encounters among the major states. Results show that critical points tend to incline states to initiate deterrence confrontations and escalate them to war. Democratic states, however, are less susceptible to these tendencies than authoritarian ones. Results also show that changes in power trajectories do affect the occurrence and outcome of deterrence encounters among the great powers.

Key Words: power cycles • national power • war • risk propensity • deterrence

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48, No. 2, 131-153 (2004)
DOI: 10.1177/0022002703262857
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Home page
 Conflict Management and Peace ScienceHome page
L. J. Carlson and R. Dacey
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Conflict Management and Peace Science, April 1, 2006; 23(2): 181 - 198.
[Abstract] [PDF]