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Journal of Conflict Resolution
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The Limitations of Fair Division

An Experimental Evaluation of Three Procedures

Gerald Schneider

Department of Politics and Management, Universität Konstanz, Germany

Ulrike Sabrina Krämer

Department of Politics and Management, Universität Konstanz, Germany

Mathematical procedures that promise an envy-free, equitable, and efficient solution to distributional conflicts have received widespread attention. Two fair-division mechanisms, adjusted Knaster and proportional Knaster, which are similar to the well-known adjusted-winner procedure, are compared with the less fair divide-and-choose mechanism. Results show that participants largely prefer the adjusted-Knaster procedure to the two alternatives. Adjusted Knaster, closely followed by proportional Knaster, also promises the highest average payoff. Yet the sophisticated mechanisms cease to perform better than divide-and-choose once actors receive the possibility to deviate from the mandatory bargaining protocols of fair-division procedures. The preference for adjusted and proportional Knaster is found to be a partial function of the participants’ psychological profile. The more "antisocial" a participant, the more likely this respondent is to opt for a procedure with a compensatory mechanism.

Key Words: fair division • experimental political science • bargaining • two-person games • proportional • Knaster • adjusted winner • Knaster

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48, No. 4, 506-524 (2004)
DOI: 10.1177/0022002704266148
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[Abstract] [PDF]