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Journal of Conflict Resolution
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Going Private

Public Opinion, Presidential Rhetoric, and the Domestic Politics of Audience Costs in U.S. Foreign Policy Crises

Matthew A. Baum

Department of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles

This study investigates why, despite the potential credibility enhancement associated with generating domestic audience costs, leaders (in this instance, U.S. presidents) frequently opt to "go private" by conducting foreign policy out of the public spotlight. The author argues that they do so for two primary reasons: (1) public scrutiny disproportionately raises the potential political price of a bad outcome, and (2) leaders’ efforts to generate audience costs can sometimes backfire, as the reactions of the domestic "audience"—once engaged—are not entirely predictable. An analysis of U.S. behavior in all international crises between 1946 and 1994 shows that when national security interests in a crisis are modest, American presidents are indeed less likely to speak publicly about potential adversaries, unless they are quite confident of success if a fight ensues.

Key Words: foreign policy • audience costs • president • war • public opinion • international conflict

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48, No. 5, 603-631 (2004)
DOI: 10.1177/0022002704267764


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Conflict Management and Peace ScienceHome page
T. Groeling and M. A. Baum
Journalists' Incentives and Media Coverage of Elite Foreign Policy Evaluations
Conflict Management and Peace Science, November 1, 2009; 26(5): 437 - 470.
[Abstract] [PDF]