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Rivalry and Diversionary Uses of Force

Department of Political Science, University of Iowa

Brandon C. Prins

Department of Political Science, Texas Tech University

Scholars have argued for some time that the rally ’round the flag phenomenon creates incentives for political leaders to use military force to divert attention away from domestic turmoil. It is hypothesized that a state’s strategic or historical context conditions its use of military force abroad, and that the probability of diversionary uses of force is higher in opportunity-rich environments of enduring rivalry. Empirical analyses lend support to this hypothesis, showing that high levels of inflation increase the probability of militarized dispute initiation in settings of rivalry but actually decrease it in nonrival settings. However, the results are contingent on the regime type of the potential initiator. Consistent with recent strategic models of diversion, the analyses demonstrate that although democratic leaders have the greatest incentives to divert, they have fewer opportunities to do so due to the transparency of their regimes.

Key Words: interstate conflict • diversionary theory • rivalry • MID initiation

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48, No. 6, 937-961 (2004)
DOI: 10.1177/0022002704269354


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