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Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 49, No. 2, 218-236 (2005)
DOI: 10.1177/0022002704272865

Political and Militant Wings within Dissident Movements and Organizations

Kevin Siqueira

School of Business, Clarkson University

A model is developed to provide a basis for investigating the nature of faction behavior and the interrelationships between factions and between factions and their supporters under conditions of competition and cooperation. A general finding of the study illustrates the fact that when factions act competitively and independently of one another, the results do not necessarily lead to increased dissident activity and violence when compared to the case when factions act jointly and coordinate their actions. For example, when faction activities generate positive externalities and are strategic complements, competition and the independent behavior of factions lead to decreased levels of dissident activity. The model can also be used to derive implications for various types of counterterrorism policies when a government faces independently acting groups within a dissident movement.

Key Words: terrorism • counterterrorism policies • competing factions • externalities


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