This Article Full Text (PDF) References Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Similar articles in ISI Web of Science Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via HighWire Citing Articles via ISI Web of Science (9) Citing Articles via Google Scholar Google Scholar Articles by de Mesquita, E. B. Search for Related Content Social Bookmarking                   What's this?

The Terrorist Endgame

A Model with Moral Hazard and Learning

Department of Political Science, Washington University

The author models the relationship between a government and former terrorists as a game with both moral hazard and learning. The government is uncertain about both the former terrorists’ ability and skill at providing counterterrorism aid. The government has the option—after observing the success or failure of counterterrorism—of replacing the former terrorist leadership with a new negotiating partner. This study demonstrates that the threat of replacement, in addition to promised concessions, provides incentives for former terrorists to exert counterterrorism effort, particularly when the potential replacements are of moderate ability. Furthermore, the author identifies conditions under which governments are likely to replace the former-terrorist leadership with which it has been negotiating. The model also has implications for the effect of counterterrorism successes on future concessions and the impact of the government’s ability to consider replacing the former terrorists on concessions and counterterrorism.

Key Words: terrorism • counterterrorism • moral hazard • learning • concessions • negotiation

CiteULike    Connotea    Del.icio.us    Digg    Reddit    Technorati    What's this?

This article has been cited by other articles:

				D. Jacobson and E. H. Kaplan Suicide Bombings and Targeted Killings in (Counter-) Terror Games Journal of Conflict Resolution, October 1, 2007; 51(5): 772 - 792. [Abstract] [PDF]

				B. P. Rosendorff and T. Sandler The Political Economy of Transnational Terrorism Journal of Conflict Resolution, April 1, 2005; 49(2): 171 - 182. [PDF]

				K. Siqueira Political and Militant Wings within Dissident Movements and Organizations Journal of Conflict Resolution, April 1, 2005; 49(2): 218 - 236. [Abstract] [PDF]