Advanced Search

Journal Navigation

Journal Home

Subscriptions

Archive

Contact Us

Table of Contents

CiteULike is a free service for managing and discovering scholarly references - click here to get started.

Sign In to gain access to subscriptions and/or personal tools.
Journal of Conflict Resolution
This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow References
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Right arrow Citation Map
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to Saved Citations
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Right arrow Request Reprints
Right arrow Add to My Marked Citations
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via HighWire
Right arrow Citing Articles via Google Scholar
Right arrow Citing Articles via Scopus
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Dunning, T.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike   Add to Complore   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us   Add to Digg   Add to Reddit   Add to Technorati   Add to Twitter  
What's this?

Resource Dependence, Economic Performance, and Political Stability

Thad Dunning

Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley

In many resource-dependent states, elites may face an important trade-off between the economic benefits of diversification and the possibility for future political competition that diversification may engender. However, distinctive features of global resource markets and national political economies may make diversification more or less attractive to political elites. The author argues that in three cases which illustrate the equilibrium paths of the game-theoretic model developed here—postindependence Bostwana, Mobutu’s Zaire, and Suharto’s Indonesia—three variables influenced elites’ incentives for diversification and thereby shaped outcomes along the dimensions of political stability and economic performance: the world market structure for the resource, the degree of societal opposition to elites, and the prior development of the nonresource private sector. These countries’ varied paths from resource wealth to political and economic outcomes suggest the need for conditional theories of the resource curse.

Key Words: resource curse • natural resources • political losers • economic development • Botswana • Indonesia • Zaire

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 49, No. 4, 451-482 (2005)
DOI: 10.1177/0022002705277521
Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Complore Complore   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us   Add to Digg Digg   Add to Reddit Reddit   Add to Technorati Technorati   Add to Twitter Twitter    What's this?


This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
 OXF ECON PAPHome page
C. N. Brunnschweiler and E. H. Bulte
Natural resources and violent conflict: resource abundance, dependence, and the onset of civil wars
Oxf. Econ. Pap., October 1, 2009; 61(4): 651 - 674.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

Home page
 OXF ECON PAPHome page
F. Caselli and T. Cunningham
Leader behaviour and the natural resource curse
Oxf. Econ. Pap., October 1, 2009; 61(4): 628 - 650.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

Home page
 Conflict Management and Peace ScienceHome page
D. Carment, Y. Samy, and S. Prest
State Fragility and Implications for Aid Allocation: An Empirical Analysis
Conflict Management and Peace Science, September 1, 2008; 25(4): 349 - 373.
[Abstract] [PDF]

Home page
 Journal of Conflict ResolutionHome page
J. Ron
Paradigm in Distress?: Primary Commodities and Civil War
Journal of Conflict Resolution, August 1, 2005; 49(4): 443 - 450.
[PDF]

Home page
 Journal of Conflict ResolutionHome page
P. Collier and A. Hoeffler
Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict
Journal of Conflict Resolution, August 1, 2005; 49(4): 625 - 633.
[Abstract] [PDF]