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Knowing the Unknown

Executive Evaluation and International Crisis Outcomes

Department of Politics, New York University

When voters evaluate their executive's policies, they often possess information that was previously unknownto policy makers. Should voters use such ex post information? The author presents a model of executive evaluation following an international crisis. Using ex post information can be welfare enhancing for the voter when contrasted with naive retrospection, in which voters compare pre- and postconflict utility. However, the welfare implications of using ex post information are not clear-cut when contrasted to sophisticated retrospective voting. While the latter voting rule leads to situations in which an executive is overly aggressive in crises, using ex post information can induce executive behavior that is insufficiently aggressive. Voters must balance the relative desirability of unwanted wars against unwanted passivity when deciding how to evaluate leaders. In opening up the black box of domestic politics, assumptions about voter behavior can affect substantive and normative findings.

Key Words: executive evaluation • voting • international crisis • election

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 50, No. 2, 228-252 (2006)
DOI: 10.1177/0022002705284825


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