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Journal of Conflict Resolution
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The Common Priors Assumption

A Comment on "Bargaining and the Nature of War"

Mark Fey

Department of Political Science, University of Rochester

Kristopher W. Ramsay

Department of Politics, Princeton University

In a recent article in this journal, Smith and Stam (2004) call into question the usefulness and applicability of what is know as the common priors assumption in the modeling of countries' strategic behavior in international relations. While the authors of this comment acknowledge that it is possible to incorporate noncommon priors in models of politics in a mathematically consistent fashion, they do not agree with the article's claims regarding the limitations of the common priors approach, which motivate Smith and Stam's rejection of it.

Key Words: war • bargaining • common priors

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 50, No. 4, 607-613 (2006)
DOI: 10.1177/0022002706289182
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