This Article Full Text (PDF) References Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via Google Scholar Citing Articles via Scopus Google Scholar Articles by Smith, A. Articles by Stam, A. C. Search for Related Content Social Bookmarking                         What's this?

Divergent Beliefs in "Bargaining and the Nature of War"

A Reply to Fey and Ramsay

Department of Political Science, New York University

Allan C. Stam

Government Department, Dartmouth College

Mark Fey and Kristopher Ramsay (2006) take issue with the presentation of how players' beliefs diverge in "Bargaining and the Nature of War" (Smith and Stam 2004). In that article, the authors constructed a model of bargaining between two nations in which the nations have noncommon priors about the probability with which either nation would eventually prevail, should a war between them continue to a decisive conclusion. The players' divergent beliefs make up one of the fundamental potential causes of war in the model. Fey and Ramsay argue that Smith and Stam's departure from the standard common priors assumption is an unnecessary deviation from convention. The authors disagree, arguing that their different approach to modeling disagreement between rational actors provides a useful way to approach the empirical puzzle they set out to explore, namely, how rational actors with divergent beliefs might settle their disagreements in the context of war.

Key Words: bargaining • common priors • war • rational choice • disagreement

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 50, No. 4, 614-618 (2006)
DOI: 10.1177/0022002706289183


CiteULike    Complore    Connotea    Del.icio.us    Digg    Reddit    Technorati    Twitter    What's this?