Advanced Search

Journal Navigation

Journal Home

Subscriptions

Archive

Contact Us

Table of Contents

CiteULike is a free service for managing and discovering scholarly references - click here to get started.

Sign In to gain access to subscriptions and/or personal tools.
Journal of Conflict Resolution
This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow References
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Similar articles in Web of Science
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to Saved Citations
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Right arrow Request Reprints
Right arrow Add to My Marked Citations
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via HighWire
Right arrow Citing Articles via Web of Science (2)
Right arrow Citing Articles via Google Scholar
Right arrow Citing Articles via Scopus
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Siqueira, K.
Right arrow Articles by Sandler, T.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike   Add to Complore   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us   Add to Digg   Add to Reddit   Add to Technorati   Add to Twitter  
What's this?

Terrorists versus the Government

Strategic Interaction, Support, and Sponsorship

Kevin Siqueira

School of Economic, Political and Policy Sciences, University of Texas at Dallas

Todd Sandler

School of Economic, Political and Policy Sciences, University of Texas at Dallas

This article focuses on the strategic interaction between a terrorist group and a government as both vie for grassroots support. When terrorists and the government act contemporaneously, the equilibrium outcome depends on the effectiveness of the government’s countermeasures and the ability of the government to curb popular support of the terrorists through public spending. In two alternative scenarios, the authors establish that leadership may improve both adversaries’ well-being while reducing terrorism. The leader changes in the two cases, with the weaker player going first to the advantage of both players. State sponsorship and franchising of terrorists augment violence as both adversaries expend more effort. Sponsors can offset some strategic limits to violence that competition for supporters offers.

Key Words: noncooperative game • leader-follower • terrorism • counterterrorism • state sponsorship

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 50, No. 6, 878-898 (2006)
DOI: 10.1177/0022002706293469
Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Complore Complore   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us   Add to Digg Digg   Add to Reddit Reddit   Add to Technorati Technorati   Add to Twitter Twitter    What's this?


This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
 Simulation GamingHome page
T. Sandler and K. Siqueira
Games and Terrorism: Recent Developments
Simulation Gaming, April 1, 2009; 40(2): 164 - 192.
[Abstract] [PDF]

Home page
 Journal of Conflict ResolutionHome page
D. Jacobson and E. H. Kaplan
Suicide Bombings and Targeted Killings in (Counter-) Terror Games
Journal of Conflict Resolution, October 1, 2007; 51(5): 772 - 792.
[Abstract] [PDF]