Advanced Search

Journal Navigation

Journal Home

Subscriptions

Archive

Contact Us

Table of Contents

Click here to sign up for SAGE Journal Email Alerts today!

Sign In to gain access to subscriptions and/or personal tools.
Journal of Conflict Resolution
This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow Dataset
Right arrow References
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Right arrow Citation Map
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Similar articles in Web of Science
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to Saved Citations
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Right arrow Request Reprints
Right arrow Add to My Marked Citations
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via HighWire
Right arrow Citing Articles via Web of Science (1)
Right arrow Citing Articles via Google Scholar
Right arrow Citing Articles via Scopus
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Sullivan, P. L.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
 Add to CiteULike   Add to Complore   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us   Add to Digg   Add to Reddit   Add to Technorati   Add to Twitter  
What's this?

War Aims and War Outcomes

Why Powerful States Lose Limited Wars

Patricia L. Sullivan

Department of International Affairs University of Georgia, Athens

Why are states with tremendous advantages in capabilities and resources often unable to attain even limited objectives vis-à-vis much weaker adversaries? The theory I develop focuses on how the nature of a strong state's war aims affects prewar uncertainty about the cost of victory. I argue that the relative magnitude of the effect of military strength and resolve on war outcomes varies with the nature of the object at stake and that strong states become more likely to underestimate the cost of victory as the impact of resolve increases relative to that of war-fighting capacity. I evaluate the empirical implications of this theory against the historical record provided by the universe of major power military interventions since World War II. The results challenge both existing theories and conventional wisdom about the impact of factors such as military strength, resolve, troop commitment levels, and war-fighting strategies on asymmetric war outcomes.

Key Words: asymmetric war • military intervention • use of force • war outcomes

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 51, No. 3, 496-524 (2007)
DOI: 10.1177/0022002707300187


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Complore Complore   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us   Add to Digg Digg   Add to Reddit Reddit   Add to Technorati Technorati   Add to Twitter Twitter    What's this?


This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
Journal of Peace ResearchHome page
J. Pickering and E. F. Kisangani
The International Military Intervention Dataset: An Updated Resource for Conflict Scholars
Journal of Peace Research, July 1, 2009; 46(4): 589 - 599.
[Abstract] [PDF]


Home page
Conflict Management and Peace ScienceHome page
P. L. Sullivan
Sustaining the Fight: A Cross-Sectional Time-Series Analysis of Public Support for Ongoing Military Interventions
Conflict Management and Peace Science, April 1, 2008; 25(2): 112 - 135.
[Abstract] [PDF]


Home page
Conflict Management and Peace ScienceHome page
Z. Maoz and R. M. Siverson
Bargaining, Domestic Politics, and International Context in the Management of War: A Review Essay
Conflict Management and Peace Science, April 1, 2008; 25(2): 171 - 189.
[Abstract] [PDF]


Home page
Conflict Management and Peace ScienceHome page
P. L. Sullivan
At What Price Victory? The Effects of Uncertainty on Military Intervention Duration and Outcome
Conflict Management and Peace Science, February 1, 2008; 25(1): 49 - 66.
[Abstract] [PDF]