This Article Full Text (PDF) References Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Similar articles in Web of Science Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via Google Scholar Citing Articles via Scopus Google Scholar Articles by Plümper, T. Articles by Schneider, C. J. Search for Related Content Social Bookmarking                         What's this?

Discriminatory European Union Membership and the Redistribution of Enlargement Gains

Government Department University of Essex, Colchester, United Kingdom

Christina J. Schneider

Department of Politics and International Relations University of Oxford and Max Planck Institute of Economics, Oxford, United Kingdom

Conflicts between European Union (EU) members about enlargement result from its redistributive effects. EU members are more likely to suffer from enlargement if they profit from EU transfers and if they are relatively close to applicant countries in which unemployment is significantly higher than in member countries. Phasing in membership rights serves to compensate the relative losers of enlargement to accomplish EU widening. Using data from all previous enlargement rounds until 2004, we demonstrate that EU members are more likely to demand a discrimination of new members if distributional conflicts arise. The existence of these distributional conflicts in turn increases the odds of EU members and the accession candidates actually agreeing on a phase-in period.

Key Words: European Union • discriminatory membership • EU enlargement • Eastern enlargement

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 51, No. 4, 568-587 (2007)
DOI: 10.1177/0022002707302793


CiteULike    Complore    Connotea    Del.icio.us    Digg    Reddit    Technorati    Twitter    What's this?