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Bargaining, Nuclear Proliferation, and Interstate DisputesDepartment of Political Science University of California, San Diego
Department of International Relations University of Seoul, Republic of Korea Contrasting claims about the consequences of nuclear weapons rely on different interpretations about how leaders respond to risk, uncertainty, and the balance of power. Nuclear optimists use deterrence theory to argue that proliferation can promote stability and inhibit the use of force. Pessimists argue that proliferation precipitates nuclear hubris, accident, or anger that heightens the risk of war. It is also possible that nuclear weapons have no net effect on dispute propensity. Since states fashion their own bargains, nuclear status is bound to influence the distribution of influence. Proliferation also reflects existing tensions, biasing upward the apparent impact of nuclear weapons on conventional conflict. Instrumenting for the decision to proliferate, the authors find that nuclear weapons increase diplomatic status without much affecting whether states fight.
Key Words: nuclear proliferation • nuclear weapons • militarized disputes • conflict • diplomacy
This version was published on April
1, 2009 Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 53, No. 2,
209-233 (2009) This article has been cited by other articles:
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