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Communication and Guilt in a Prisoner’s Dilemma

¹ SITE, Stockholm School of Economics, Sweden
² CentER & TIBER & TILEC, Tilburg University, the Netherlands

^* To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: S.Suetens{at}uvt.nl.

	Abstract

In this article, the authors measure experienced guilt in a prisoner’s-dilemma experiment with preplay communication. The authors find that feelings of guilt only arise in the case of unilateral defection and that they are stronger when players have mutually agreed to cooperate. The authors also find that fining unilateral defection reduces feelings of guilt.

First published on September 22, 2008, doi:10.1177/0022002708322325

Journal of Conflict Resolution 2008;52:945.

A more recent version of this article appeared on December 1, 2008


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