This Article Full Text (OnlineFirst PDF) Data Set All Versions of this Article: 0022002708330581v1 53/2/302    most recent Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via Google Scholar Citing Articles via Scopus Google Scholar Articles by Montgomery, A. H. Articles by Sagan, S. D. Search for Related Content Social Bookmarking                         What's this?

The Perils of Predicting Proliferation

¹ Department of Political Science, Reed College
² Department of Political Science, Stanford University

^* To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: ahm{at}reed.edu.

	Abstract

Studies of nuclear proliferation share five serious problems. First, nuclear programs’ initiation and completion dates are ambiguous and difficult to code, but findings are rarely subjected to sufficient robustness tests using alternative codings. Second, independent variables overlook important factors such as prestige and bureaucratic power and often use poor proxies for concepts such as the nonproliferation regime. Third, methodologies and data sets should be tightly coupled to empirical questions but are instead often chosen for convenience. Fourth, some findings provide insights already known or believed to be true. Fifth, findings can ignore or gloss over data crucial for policy making and wider debates. This article reviews new quantitative research on nuclear proliferation, noting improved analysis and lingering problems. It highlights the 1999 Kargil war to explore dangers of relying on stock data sets and the need for research on statistical outliers. It concludes with a future research agenda aimed at correcting problems and a cautionary note regarding hasty application of quantitative results to policy making.

First published on February 4, 2009, doi:10.1177/0022002708330581

Journal of Conflict Resolution 2009;53:302.

A more recent version of this article appeared on April 1, 2009


CiteULike    Complore    Connotea    Del.icio.us    Digg    Reddit    Technorati    Twitter    What's this?