Journal of Conflict Resolution recent issues

Demands for UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping: Nonvoluntary versus Voluntary Contributions to a Public Good

Gaibulloev, K., Sandler, T., Shimizu, H. — Thu, 12 Nov 2009 16:31:12 PST

This article presents alternative estimates for the demand for UN and non-UN peacekeeping. Generally, three-way fixed-effects models, which account for the country, year, and conflict region, provide the best estimates. The demand for UN peacekeeping is primarily influenced by the contributions of other nations (i.e., spillins), with spillin elasticity not significantly different from 1. For non-UN peacekeeping, both spillins and country-specific interests in the conflict region influence contributions. These peacekeepers’ interests include trade and FDI concerns, along with proximity to the conflict. Peacekeeping missions appear partitioned: UN missions for global public benefits and non-UN missions for peacekeeper-specific benefits.

Political Groups, Leader Change, and the Pattern of International Cooperation

Smith, A. — Thu, 12 Nov 2009 16:31:12 PST

Nations are politically heterogeneous and which group is in political ascendency shapes the nature of interstate cooperation through two mechanisms. First, groups differ in the benefits they receive from cooperation. This affects which groups can commit to cooperate. Second, a nation may selectively withhold cooperation from one group to influence the domestic political competition between groups in another nation. By integrating political competition between leaders of different groups under different institutional rules into a prisoner’s dilemma model of international cooperation, the theory generates hypotheses relating leader turnover, group membership, and patterns of cooperation.

Democracy, Foreign Policy, and Terrorism

Savun, B., Phillips, B. J. — Thu, 12 Nov 2009 16:31:12 PST

This article takes a closer look at the relationship between democracy and transnational terrorism. It investigates what it is about democracies that make them particularly vulnerable to terrorism from abroad. The authors suggest that states that exhibit a certain type of foreign policy behavior, regardless of their regime type, are likely to attract transnational terrorism. States that are actively involved in international politics are likely to create resentment abroad and hence more likely to be the target of transnational terrorism than are states that pursue a more isolationist foreign policy. Democratic states are more likely to be targeted by transnational terrorist groups not because of their regime type per se but because of the type of foreign policy they tend to pursue. The empirical analysis provides support for the argument.

Partisan Divide on War and the Economy: Presidential Approval of G. W. Bush

Fox, G. T. — Thu, 12 Nov 2009 16:31:12 PST

This study examines the influence of 9/11, the Iraq War, the economy, and the coalition-of-minorities on presidential approval of G. W. Bush across partisan subgroups and aggregate popularity. The analysis considers the effect of underlying partisan preferences on overall approval. A partisan divide occurs for war and the economy on Bush popularity. The events of 9/11 and the Iraq War affect Democratic opinions of Bush more than Republican opinions, whereas the economy impacts Republicans more than Democrats. An in-party/out-party rally effect occurs. Democrats show stronger rallies than Republicans for 9/11 and the Iraq War, but also faster and deeper popularity decay of the rallies. All economic and war-related effects significantly influence Independents and aggregate Bush popularity. The coalition-of-minorities pattern of declining presidential approval is caused by the 9/11 rally decay effect, the war casualties effect, and the slowing economy during Bush’s second term in office.

Estimating War Deaths: An Arena of Contestation

Spagat, M., Mack, A., Cooper, T., Kreutz, J. — Thu, 12 Nov 2009 16:31:12 PST

In a much-cited recent article, Obermeyer, Murray, and Gakidou (2008a) examine estimates of wartime fatalities from injuries for thirteen countries. Their analysis poses a major challenge to the battle-death estimating methodology widely used by conflict researchers, engages with the controversy over whether war deaths have been increasing or decreasing in recent decades, and takes the debate over different approaches to battle-death estimation to a new level. In making their assessments, the authors compare war death reports extracted from World Health Organization (WHO) sibling survey data with the battle-death estimates for the same countries from the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). The analysis that leads to these conclusions is not compelling, however. Thus, while the authors argue that the PRIO estimates are too low by a factor of three, their comparison fails to compare like with like. Their assertion that there is "no evidence" to support the PRIO finding that war deaths have recently declined also fails. They ignore war-trend data for the periods after 1994 and before 1955, base their time trends on extrapolations from a biased convenience sample of only thirteen countries, and rely on an estimated constant that is statistically insignificant.

Overcoming Psychological Barriers to Peaceful Conflict Resolution: The Role of Arguments about Losses

Gayer, C. C., Landman, S., Halperin, E., Bar-Tal, D. — Thu, 12 Nov 2009 16:31:12 PST

One of the most important psychological barriers to conflict resolution is the rigid structure of the sociopsychological repertoire that evolves in societies immersed in intractable conflict. This article examines ways to overcome the rigidity of this repertoire in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Specifically, in line with the prospect theory, the authors assumed that elicitation of beliefs about losses stemming from the continuing conflict may bring about a process of "unfreezing." To test this assumption, an exploratory study with a national sample of the Israeli-Jewish population and two subsequent experimental studies were conducted. The results demonstrated that exposure to information about losses inherent in continuing the conflict induces higher willingness to acquire new information about possible solutions to the conflict, higher willingness to reevaluate current positions about it, and more support for compromises than the exposure to neutral information or to information about possible gains derived from the peace agreement.

The Equifinality of War Termination: Multiple Paths to Ending War

Stanley, E. A., Sawyer, J. P. — Tue, 15 Sep 2009 11:49:06 PDT

The authors’ theory contributes an alternative domestic politics pathway to traditional bargaining models of war termination. In bargaining models, the rational updating process that produces an overlapping bargaining space can develop a significant lag, which extends the war beyond a logical ending point. The authors posit that a change in the domestic governing coalition is often necessary to kick-start this updating process once it has become bogged down through preference, information, and entrapment obstacles. The authors demonstrate that domestic coalition shifts are a critical path to peace, using survival analysis techniques on Bennett and Stam’s (1996) war-level data set of wars (1862-1990) and a new belligerent-level data set of wars (1945-2006). These tests show that because war policies can become institutionalized over time, there is a very strong link between coalition shifts and war termination.

"Don't Let Them Die in Vain": Casualty Frames and Public Tolerance for Escalating Commitment in Iraq

Boettcher, W. A., Cobb, M. D. — Tue, 15 Sep 2009 11:49:06 PDT

This article builds on past framing research to probe the impact of casualty frames on the public’s willingness to expend additional "blood and treasure" in an ongoing war. The rhetoric of "sunk costs" (often described as "sacrifices") that must be redeemed through further conflict is a well-known, yet irrational, trope. Utilizing an experiment embedded in a nationally representative survey on attitudes about Iraq, we find that "investment frames" increase support for the war among individuals who believe the U.S. "did the right thing in Iraq," but decrease support for the war among those who feel the U.S. "should have stayed out." We also find, however, that framing effects are inconsistent when the frames are attributed to sources. These latter results demonstrate the importance of including unattributed frames to evaluate source effects in framing research.

Regime Type and Bilateral Treaty Formalization: Do Too Many Cooks Spoil the Soup?

Garriga, A. C. — Tue, 15 Sep 2009 11:49:06 PDT

How does domestic regime type affect bilateral cooperation, and one of its most visible manifestations, bilateral treaties? This article explains how domestic political regime affects bilateral cooperation and, contrary to the expectations of some scholars, why autocracies should be expected to be more likely than democracies to enter into bilateral treaties. If the preferences of a pair of states are not identical, the sets of agreements that each party would consent to (win-sets) need to overlap for a bilateral treaty to be acceptable. Because additional domestic constraints reduce the size of a country’s win-set, autocracies should have broader win-sets than democracies. Therefore, autocratic dyads should be more likely to formalize bilateral treaties than other pairs of states. Based on an original data set, I present empirical evidence showing that pairs of autocracies are more likely than other pairs of states to enter into agreements formalizing bilateral cooperation.

Still Not Pushing Back: Why the European Union Is Not Balancing the United States

Howorth, J., Menon, A. — Tue, 15 Sep 2009 11:49:06 PDT

A recent wave of scholarly literature has argued forcibly that the European Union’s European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) represents an attempt on the part of the EU to "balance" against the United States. According to such analyses, the EU is reacting to American global preeminence by building up its military capacities to enhance its own ability to play a significant, autonomous role in international affairs. This article takes issue with such claims. It points, first, to significant theoretical and methodological shortcomings inherent in the work of the "soft balancers." Second, and more fundamentally, it subjects this work to careful empirical scrutiny and illustrates how the soft balancers have fundamentally misunderstood ESDP. Finally, it illustrates how such misinterpretations result from a failure to appreciate the profound impact that institutional structures wield over substantive outcomes in international security affairs.

Target Concessions in the Shadow of Intervention

Yuen, A. — Tue, 15 Sep 2009 11:49:06 PDT

Why do targets sometimes make concessions when third parties offer assistance? Both the extended deterrence and alliance literatures point to unreliable third parties to explain deterrence failure and target acquiescence. On the other hand, the alliance literature also suggests that third parties present a moral-hazard situation in which targets will behave less prudently when they have outside support. Without dismissing the importance of these dynamics, I demonstrate that targets will still make concessions when intervention is certain, and that interveners do not always embolden targets in crisis situations. Counterintuitively, interveners alter the bargaining situation, shifting the bargaining space so that conceding is more attractive than war for the target state. Instead of emboldening targets, third parties deter larger demands and produce settlement outcomes that reduce the burden on the target.

Same Game, New Tricks: What Makes a Good Strategy in the Prisoner's Dilemma?

Pelc, A., Pelc, K. J. — Tue, 15 Sep 2009 11:49:06 PDT

The aim of this article is to distinguish between strategies in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma on the basis of their relative performance in a given population set. We first define a natural order on such strategies that disregards isolated disturbances, by using the limit of time-average payoffs. This order allows us to consider one strategy as strictly better than another in some population of strategies. We then determine a strategy to be ‘‘robust,’’ if in any population consisting of copies of two types of strategies, itself and some other strategy , the strategy is never worse than . We present a large class of such robust strategies. Strikingly, robustness can accommodate an arbitrary level of generosity, conditional on the strength of subsequent retaliation; and it does not require symmetric retaliation. Taken together, these findings allow us to design strategies that significantly lessen the problem of noise, without forsaking performance. Finally, we show that no strategy exhibits robustness in all population sets of three or more strategy types.

Repressive Threats, Procedural Concessions, and the Zapatista Cycle of Protests, 1994--2003

Inclan, M. d. l. L. — Tue, 15 Sep 2009 11:49:06 PDT

Using negative binomial models, I analyze the effects of repressive threats and procedural concessions on Zapatista protests from 1994 to 2003. Some of the results appear consistent with previous findings in the literature. Repressive threats had a negative initial effect and a positive delayed effect on protest activity and its simultaneous location across cities. However, procedural concessions had statistically insignificant negative initial and delayed effects on protests and their simultaneous location. Also contrary to the literature, when procedural concessions and repressive threats were combined, they had statistically insignificant positive initial and delayed effects on protest activity and its simultaneous location. Finally, democratization changes decreased Zapatista protests in the short and long term and helped to focus mobilization efforts on the remaining closed environments. Thus, democratization openings and an inconsistent use of repressive threats and procedural concessions did not strengthen the development of the movement; they contributed to the movement’s relative weakness.

Introduction to Special Issue on "Disaggregating Civil War"

Cederman, L.-E., Gleditsch, K. S. — Mon, 06 Jul 2009 14:56:19 PDT

We introduce the contributions to this special issue on "Disaggregating Civil War." We review the problems arising from excessive aggregation in studies of civil war, and outline how disaggregation promises to provide better insights into the causes and dynamics of civil wars, using the articles in this special issue as examples. We comment on the issue of the appropriate level of disaggregation, lessons learned from these articles, and issues for further research.

Ethno-Nationalist Dyads and Civil War: A GIS-Based Analysis

Cederman, L.-E., Buhaug, H., Rod, J. K. — Mon, 06 Jul 2009 14:56:19 PDT

Previous quantitative research on ethnic civil war relies on macro-level proxies in an attempt to specify the conditions under which ethnic minorities rebel. Going beyond an exclusive focus on minorities, the present study employs Geographic Information Systems (GIS) as a way to model ethnic center—periphery dyads that confront governments with excluded groups. We construct and analyze a new dataset of geo-referenced politically relevant ethnic groups, covering the entire world during the period from 1951 through 2005. Our results show that the conflict probability of marginalized groups increases with the demographic power balance compared to the group(s) in power. Furthermore, the risk of conflict increases with the distance from the group to the capital, and the roughness of the terrain in the group's settlement area. We also find that while the results for demographic group strength hold for all ethnic civil wars, the geographic factors apply for territorial ethnic conflicts only.

Geography as Motivation and Opportunity: Group Concentration and Ethnic Conflict

Weidmann, N. B. — Mon, 06 Jul 2009 14:56:19 PDT

The literature suggests that geographically concentrated groups face a higher likelihood of conflict. While this finding seems to be commonly accepted, there is no clear consensus that explains why this is the case. Two competing mechanisms have been proposed: first, a motivation-driven mechanism, where the existence of a well-defined group territory makes the group more likely to fight for it; and second, an opportunity-driven link, where concentration facilitates group coordination for collective action. This article aims to resolve this controversy by developing new settlement pattern indicators based on Geographic Information Systems (GIS) data. Using conflict data at the level of ethnic groups, I show that there is clear evidence in favor of the opportunity mechanism. Thus, the effect of group concentration on conflict seems to be driven by the strategic advantages for group coordination that the spatial proximity of group members provides.

Geography, Rebel Capability, and the Duration of Civil Conflict

Buhaug, H., Gates, S., Lujala, P. — Mon, 06 Jul 2009 14:56:19 PDT

Why do some armed civil conflicts last longer than others? Drawing on a contest success function model, we show that geographic factors (such as location, terrain, and natural resources) interact with rebel fighting capacity and together play a crucial role in determining the duration of conflict. Using precisely dated duration data in event history models and geographic data for the conflict location, we find that conflicts located at considerable distance from the main government stronghold, along remote international borders and in regions with valuable minerals last substantially longer. In addition, we find that rebel military capacity in its own right increases the prospects of a civil conflict ending within a short time period. Our findings imply that the distances an army must travel to project power, rebel fighting capacity, and characteristics of conflict region affect how a civil war is fought and who will prevail.

It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome

Cunningham, D. E., Skrede Gleditsch, K., Salehyan, I. — Mon, 06 Jul 2009 14:56:19 PDT

Theories of conflict emphasize dyadic interaction, yet existing empirical studies of civil war focus largely on state attributes and pay little attention to nonstate antagonists. We recast civil war in a dyadic perspective, and consider how nonstate actor attributes and their relationship to the state influence conflict dynamics. We argue that strong rebels, who pose a military challenge to the government, are likely to lead to short wars and concessions. Conflicts where rebels seem weak can become prolonged if rebels can operate in the periphery so as to defy a government victory yet are not strong enough to extract concessions. Conflicts should be shorter when potential insurgents can rely on alternative political means to violence. We examine these hypotheses in a dyadic analysis of civil war duration and outcomes, using new data on nonstate actors and conflict attributes, finding support for many of our conjectures.

Poverty and Civil War Events: A Disaggregated Study of Liberia

Hegre, H., Ostby, G., Raleigh, C. — Mon, 06 Jul 2009 14:56:19 PDT

This article examines the link between subnational poverty and the location of civil war events. Drawing on the ACLED dataset, which breaks internal conflicts down to individual events at the local level, we take a disaggregated approach to the study of conflict. Local-level socioeconomic data are taken from the Liberian Demographic and Health Survey. With geographical cells of approximately 76 km² as units of analysis, we test how absolute and relative welfare affect the presence and number of conflict events during the 1989-2002 Liberian civil war. We control for neighboring conflict events, distance to Monrovia and national borders, population density, diamond deposits, and ethnic affiliations. War events were more frequent in the richer locations. This may provide better support for "opportunity" explanations than for "relative deprivation" theories of conflict, but we argue that the relative weakness of the Liberian government makes it difficult to distinguish between the two.

Rebel Groups as Predatory Organizations: The Political Effects of the 2004 Tsunami in Indonesia and Sri Lanka

Beardsley, K., McQuinn, B. — Mon, 06 Jul 2009 14:56:19 PDT

In this article we propose a new typology for insurgent groups to explain why in such remarkably similar conflicts—Sri Lanka and Aceh—the impact of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami was so different. We argue that two principal factors shape all rebel groups by defining their incentive structures: the efficiency of the return on investment of the primary source(s) of support and the group's territorial objectives. The former factor is especially strong in explaining the different choices made by the LTTE and GAM. In Sri Lanka, the availability of lucrative resources outside the country has made the LTTE leadership inimical to compromise, threatened by relief aid, and less reliant on the local population. Lacking access to such high-return funding sources, GAM on the other hand was more closely linked to the needs of the local population and found greater value in both outside aid and a comprehensive settlement.

Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks?: Evidence from Chechnya

Lyall, J. — Mon, 04 May 2009 11:15:27 PDT

Does a state's use of indiscriminate violence incite insurgent attacks? To date, most existing theories and empirical studies have concluded that such violence is highly counterproductive because it creates new grievances while forcing victims to seek security, if not safety, in rebel arms. This proposition is tested using Russian artillery fire in Chechnya (2000 to 2005) to estimate indiscriminate violence's effect on subsequent patterns of insurgent attacks across matched pairs of similar shelled and nonshelled villages. The findings are counterintuitive. Shelled villages experience a 24 percent reduction in posttreatment mean insurgent attacks relative to control villages. In addition, commonly cited "triggers" for insurgent retaliation, including the lethality and destructiveness of indiscriminate violence, are either negatively correlated with insurgent attacks or statistically insignificant.

A New Stress-Based Model of Political Extremism: Personal Exposure to Terrorism, Psychological Distress, and Exclusionist Political Attitudes

Canetti-Nisim, D., Halperin, E., Sharvit, K., Hobfoll, S. E. — Mon, 04 May 2009 11:15:27 PDT

Does exposure to terrorism lead to hostility toward minorities? Drawing on theories from clinical and social psychology, we propose a stress-based model of political extremism in which psychological distress—which is largely overlooked in political scholarship—and threat perceptions mediate the relationship between exposure to terrorism and attitudes toward minorities. To test the model, a representative sample of 469 Israeli Jewish respondents was interviewed on three occasions at six-month intervals. Structural Equation Modeling indicated that exposure to terrorism predicted psychological distress (t1), which predicted perceived threat from Palestinian citizens of Israel (t2), which, in turn, predicted exclusionist attitudes toward Palestinian citizens of Israel (t3). These findings provide solid evidence and a mechanism for the hypothesis that terrorism introduces nondemocratic attitudes threatening minority rights. It suggests that psychological distress plays an important role in political decision making and should be incorporated in models drawing upon political psychology.

Reaping What You Sow: Democratic Transitions and Foreign Policy Realignment

Ratner, E. — Mon, 04 May 2009 11:15:28 PDT

Why do states realign their foreign policies? I argue that democratic transitions are an important cause of foreign-policy realignment with the United States and, furthermore, that the nature of that realignment is conditioned by whether the United States supported the previous nondemocratic regime. American support, or lack thereof, for the ancien régime structures the domestic politics of democratic transitions. In the absence of previous U.S. support, democratization commonly leads to positive foreign-policy realignment toward the United States. Conversely, when the United States supports nondemocratic regimes, democratic transitions rarely produce positive realignment. I use an original data set of country— year dyads with the United States from 1950 to 2000. Using Markov Transition regression models, I find that the interaction of democratic transition and previous U.S. support is a powerful determinant of foreign-policy realignment. This research has important implications for international relations theory and American foreign policy.

Pre-emptive or Arbitrary: Two Forms of Lethal Violence in a Civil War

Herreros, F., Criado, H. — Mon, 04 May 2009 11:15:28 PDT

This article analyzes the determinants of the variation in the levels of lethal violence against civilians during a civil war. It departs from the usual explanations of this variation, advancing two different logics to account for civilians' victimization: strategic violence directed to avoid rebellions by targeting would-be political entrepreneurs and violence as a consequence of the breakdown of the state's authority. It uses a new data set on violence against civilians during the Spanish Civil War of 1936 to 1939.

Who Brings Which Peace?: Neutral versus Biased Mediation and Institutional Peace Arrangements in Civil Wars

Svensson, I. — Mon, 04 May 2009 11:15:28 PDT

This study examines the effect of biased versus neutral mediation on the content of peace agreements. The author argues that neutral mediators, who are engaged primarily because of their interest to end the war, will have incentives to hasten the reaching of an agreement to the expense of its quality. By contrast, biased mediators, seeking to protect their protégés, will take care to ensure that there are stipulations in an agreement guaranteeing the interest of "their" side or use their particular access and leverage to make their side agree to costly concessions. Biased mediation processes are therefore more likely than neutral mediation processes to lead to elaborated institutional arrangements that are generally considered conducive to democracy and durable peace, such as power sharing, third-party security guarantees, and justice provisions. Empirical analysis, covering the 1989—2004 period and building on data from 124 peace agreements, supports these claims.

A Field Manual for the Cradle of Civilization: Theory of Leadership and Lessons of Iraq

Myerson, R. B. — Mon, 04 May 2009 11:15:28 PDT

The U.S. Army's Counterinsurgency Field Manual, Bremer's My Year in Iraq, and Xenophon's Education of Cyrus all consider problems of establishing a state. Bremer sees constitutions as fundamental, and the Field Manual emphasizes local security operations and effective governance to establish legitimacy. But Xenophon shows how states are founded by leaders with reputations for reliably rewarding supporters. Agency incentive problems in government make patronage an essential aspect of state-building, and political leaders become fundamentally constrained by their reputations. Democratic competition requires many leaders to develop independent reputations for exercising power and patronage responsibly, which can be encouraged by political decentralization.