Journal of Conflict Resolution recent issues

Fighting at Home, Fighting Abroad: How Civil Wars Lead to International Disputes

Gleditsch, K. S., Salehyan, I., Schultz, K. — 2008-07-25

Although research on conflict has tended to separately study interstate conflict and civil war, states experiencing civil wars are substantially more likely to become involved in militarized disputes with other states. Scholars have typically focused on opportunistic attacks or diversionary wars to explain this domestic–international conflict nexus. The authors argue that international disputes that coincide with civil wars are more often directly tied to the issues surrounding the civil war and emphasize intervention, externalization, and unintended spillover effects from internal conflict as important sources of international friction. They empirically demonstrate that civil wars substantially increase the probability of disputes between states. An analysis of conflict narratives shows that the increased risk of interstate conflict associated with civil wars is primarily driven by states' efforts to affect the outcome of the civil war through strategies of intervention and externalization and not by an increase in conflicts over unrelated issues.

Corruption and Bilateral Aid: A Dyadic Approach

Schudel, C. J. W. — 2008-07-25

Corruption in developing states reduces the effectiveness of foreign aid that is allocated to them, because government officials in corrupt countries use this money for private rather than public purposes. Despite this, existing studies do not find different aid policies from donor governments toward corrupt and less corrupt recipients. However, most of these studies have not taken account of variation among donor states. This is an important omission, because donor states behave differently. This article argues that the responsiveness of donor states to corruption in recipient states depends on their own level of corruption: less corrupt donor states allocate more aid to less corrupt recipient states than to corrupt recipients, whereas corrupt donor states do not make such a clear distinction. This proposition is tested by both pooled ordinary least squares and fixed effects estimations. The data support the argument that corruption levels in donor states determine their reaction to corruption in recipient states.

A Violent Future? Political Risk Insurance Markets and Violence Forecasts

Jensen, N. M., Young, D. J. — 2008-07-25

There is a substantial literature that has linked past acts of violence to investment. In this article, we argue that the appropriate mechanism linking violence to investment is investor perceptions of risk, in which forward-looking investors attempt to predict the likelihood of future political violence. We take advantage of a new data source—the price paid by investors to purchase risk insurance coverage—to more accurately capture how risk is assessed in investment decision making. Building on the civil war literature, we offer a broad explanatory model of variation in violence risk in the developing world. After controlling for recent past experiences with violence, we find that wealth and democracy significantly affect the perception of risk, whereas demographic factors and natural resource endowments have limited, if any, influence.

Humanitarian Relief and Civil Conflict

Blouin, M., Pallage, S. — 2008-07-25

The authors examine the effects that famine relief efforts (food aid) can have in regions undergoing civil war. In the model, warlords seize a fraction of all aid entering the region. How much they can loot affects their choice of army size; therefore the manner in which aid is delivered influences warfare. The authors identify a delivery plan for aid that minimizes total recruitment in equilibrium.

Gravitating toward War: Preponderance May Pacify, but Power Kills

Hegre, H. — 2008-07-25

Countries have better abilities and stronger incentives to engage in militarized conflicts the larger and more powerful they are. The article applies Zipf's notion of a ``gravity model'' to the risk of interstate conflict and argues that the empirical relationship between size and distance and conflict is stronger than any other identified in dyadic statistical studies of interstate conflict. Most empirical studies of interstate conflict fail to take size properly into account. The article shows that controlling for size variables improves the estimation of other variables of interest, and it explores the impact of omitting size variables for the investigation of the power preponderance versus power parity debate. The results indicate that even though a power capability ratio variable suggests asymmetric dyads are less conflict-prone, the risk-increasing effect of power itself means that a unilateral increase of power in one country increases the risk of conflict.

Population, Resources, and Political Violence: A Subnational Study of India, 1956-2002

Urdal, H. — 2008-07-25

Recent cross-national studies have found only moderate support for the idea that population pressure and resource scarcity may lead to political violence, contrary to much of the case study literature in the field. This article suggests that the level of analysis may be at the heart of this discrepancy. In a time-series study of political violence in 27 Indian states for the 1956–2002 period, it is tested whether high population pressure on renewable natural resources, youth bulges, and differential growth rates between religious groups are associated with higher levels of armed conflict, political violent events, and Hindu-Muslim riots. The results are generally more supportive of the resource scarcity and conflict scenario than recent global studies. The article further suggests that youth bulges affect all three forms of violence and that differential growth rates are positively related to armed conflict.

The Dynamics of Reciprocity, Accountability, and Credibility

Brandt, P. T., Colaresi, M., Freeman, J. R. — 2008-05-29

Do public opinion dynamics play an important role in understanding conflict trajectories between democratic governments and other rival groups? The authors interpret several theories of opinion dynamics as competing clusters of contemporaneous causal links connoting reciprocity, accountability, and credibility. They translate these clusters into four distinct Bayesian structural time series models fit to events data from the Israeli—Palestinian conflict with variables for U.S. intervention and Jewish public opinion about prospects for peace. A credibility model, allowing Jewish public opinion to influence U.S., Palestinian, and Israeli behavior within a given month, fits best. More pacific Israeli opinion leads to more immediate Palestinian hostility toward Israelis. This response's direction suggests a negative feedback mechanism in which low-level conflict is maintained and momentum toward either all-out war or dramatic peace is slowed. In addition, a forecasting model including Jewish public opinion is shown to forecast ex ante better than a model without this variable.

On the Usefulness of Memory Skills in Social Interactions: Modifying the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

Winkler, I., Jonas, K., Rudolph, U. — 2008-05-29

The present experiment introduces a modification of the iterated prisoner's dilemma (PD). In contrast to classical dilemma situations with only one interaction partner, participants (N = 120) interacted with five fictitious interaction partners within one game, either in a random order (change condition) or against each of the interaction partners in succession (block condition). The authors assume that the change condition simulates the social interactions of a real environment more accurately and that individual memory skills are more important in the change condition as compared to the block condition. As dependent variables, the participants' score in the game was recorded, as well as the participants' memory performance concerning information about their interaction partners. Results show that good memory performance with respect to biographical information leads to higher scores only in the condition with changing interaction partners, but not in the block condition.

The Political Consequences of Assassination

Iqbal, Z., Zorn, C. — 2008-05-29

The assassination of a political leader is among the highest-profile acts of political violence, and conventional wisdom holds that such events often have substantial political, social, and economic effects on states. We investigate the extent to which the assassination of a head of state affects political stability through an analysis of all assassinations of heads of state between 1952 and 1997. We examine the political consequences of assassination by assessing the levels of political unrest, instability, and civil war in states that experience the assassination of their head of state. Our findings support the existence of an interactive relationship among assassination, leadership succession, and political turmoil: in particular, we find that assassinations' effects on political instability are greatest in systems in which the process of leadership succession is informal and unregulated.

The Effect of Political Regime on Civil War: Unpacking Anocracy

Vreeland, J. R. — 2008-05-29

Research published in the American Political Science Review shows that anocracies—as defined by the middle of the Polity index of political regime—are more susceptible to civil war than are either pure democracies or pure dictatorships. Yet, certain components of the Polity index include a factional category, where political competition is ``intense, hostile, and frequently violent. Extreme factionalism may be manifested in the establishment of rival governments and in civil war'' (Gurr 1989, 12). Not surprisingly, these components exhibit a strong relationship with civil war. When they are removed from the Polity index, however, the original relationship disappears. I conclude that the original finding is not driven by the relationship between political institutions and civil war but rather by a less provocative relationship between political violence and civil war.

The Costs of Reneging: Reputation and Alliance Formation

Gibler, D. M. — 2008-05-29

Reputations are supposed to matter. Decision makers consistently refer to reputations for resolve, and international relations theories confirm the value of being able to credibly signal intentions during times of crisis. However, empirical support for the effects of reputation has been lacking. Problems of strategic selection have hampered previous quantitative tests, and the qualitative literature provides scant support for the concept in individual crises. In this article, the author shifts the focus from crisis behavior to alliance commitments and examines the effects that opportunities to uphold previous commitments have on future alliance commitments and conflicts. The results demonstrate that alliance reputations do affect both alliance formation and dispute behavior.

Ballistic Missile Proliferation: An Empirical Investigation

Barkley, D. — 2008-05-29

This analysis examines ballistic missile proliferation in the context of strategic interactions among neighboring states. The analysis finds that when faced with ballistic missile threats, nations respond rationally and acquire ballistic missiles as a deterrent. Using a panel data set of 119 countries from 1967 to 1997, this study shows that the probability of a country procuring ballistic missiles increases nonlinearly as the number of bordering states with ballistic missiles increases. Although international norms arising from the Missile Technology Control Regime reduced the probability of missile proliferation, these externalities did not offset a state's decision to arm in response to ballistic missile arsenals in neighboring states. This analysis also finds that surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) increased the probability of proliferation in two ways: first, because ballistic missiles provided states ``ensured penetration'' of a rival's air defenses; and second, because SAMs reduced the ability of a rival to retaliate against a ballistic missile attack.

International Organizations Count

Hafner-Burton, E. M., von Stein, J., Gartzke, E. — 2008-03-18

This special issue seeks to move forward the development of an empirical research agenda that takes seriously the complexity of how international organizations (IOs) function and the need to study that complexity at all levels of analysis by using robust research tools. We advocate for a broad empirical research approach that molds and sharpens theories about IOs by conducting systematic tests in large-sample environments. Two themes create a common thread throughout this issue. First, shifting the focus from whether IOs matter to how they work requires acknowledgment of the contingency of cause and effect. A second common thread lies in the authors' treatment of IO membership as an aggregate phenomenon—that is, as a set of institutions and relationships evolving over time and with many members rather than as a single organization.

Intergovernmental Organizations and the Kantian Peace: A Network Perspective

Dorussen, H., Ward, H. — 2008-03-18

The authors use network analysis to argue that the main contribution of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) to international stability is not necessarily their direct and individual impact, because generally IGOs are institutionally weak. Rather, membership of IGOs creates network ties between states, allowing them, either individually or collectively, to intervene more effectively in latent conflicts. The IGO network also provides direct and indirect communication channels, where indirect links can act as partial substitutes for direct diplomatic ties. Empirically, the authors apply these ideas to the extensive network of international linkages created in the post—World War II period. They demonstrate that indirect links do indeed matter and that they substitute for more direct diplomatic ties. Furthermore, these effects are not limited to ties created by IGOs with specific security functions.

Power or Plenty: How Do International Trade Institutions Affect Economic Sanctions?

Hafner-Burton, E. M., Montgomery, A. H. — 2008-03-18

Does the dramatic rise of the number of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) worldwide make economic sanctions more likely through increasing the leverage of the powerful and pitting states against each other in competition (power) or less likely through increasing the benefits of trade, resolving disputes, and promoting like-minded communities (plenty)? The authors offer the first systematic test of these propositions, testing hypotheses on sanctions onset using a data set of episodes from 1947 through 2000. In favor of the plenty argument, increases in bilateral trade do decrease sanctioning behavior; in favor of the power argument, an increase in the potential sanctioner's GDP or centrality in the network of all PTAs make sanctioning much more likely. However, mutual membership in PTAs has no direct effect on the propensity of states to sanction each other.

The International Law and Politics of Climate Change: Ratification of the United Nations Framework Convention and the Kyoto Protocol

von Stein, J. — 2008-03-18

A considerable challenge for the creators of international environmental agreements is how to design mechanisms that deter defection without deterring participation. Relatively ``soft'' law often garners widespread participation, but it creates few concrete incentives for states to improve behavior. ``Harder'' commitments make shirking more difficult, but these institutional features may deter from joining the very states whose practices are least consistent with the treaty's requirements. Empirical analyses of ratification of the core agreements of the climate change regime support these propositions. Flexibility provisions provide one mechanism for states to mitigate this dilemma. The findings with regard to one flexibility mechanism strongly support this argument. The results with regard to a second flexibility mechanism, however, tend to follow an opposite pattern. The author offers a preliminary interpretation of this finding. Finally, this article provides insight into how international social networks and the strength of domestic nongovernmental organizations affect ratification.

Democratization and the Varieties of International Organizations

Mansfield, E. D., Pevehouse, J. C. — 2008-03-18

Scholars of international relations have devoted remarkably little attention to the issue of why and when states enter international organizations (IOs). We argue that states have particular reason to enter IOs during the process of democratization. In the midst of a democratic transition, state leaders have difficulty making a credible commitment to sustain reforms, since they can benefit from rolling back liberalization. Gaining membership in an IO can enhance the credibility of leaders' commitments to democratic reforms. However, not all IOs are equally useful in this regard. We distinguish between IOs that cover standards in areas such as human rights and environmental protection, those that regulate economic activity, and those that are forums for addressing broad political problems. We argue that democratizing states have greater reason to join standards-based and economic IOs than political organizations. The results of a set of statistical tests support this argument.

IO Mediation of Interstate Conflicts: Moving Beyond the Global versus Regional Dichotomy

Hansen, H. E., McLaughlin Mitchell, S., Nemeth, S. C. — 2008-03-18

Regional and global intergovernmental organizations have grown both in number and scope, yet their role and effectiveness as conflict managers is not fully understood. Previous research efforts tend to categorize organizations solely by the scope of their membership, which obscures important sources of variation in institutional design at both the regional and global levels. International organizations will be more successful conflict managers if they are highly institutionalized, if they have members with homogeneous preferences, and if they have more established democratic members. These hypotheses are evaluated with data on territorial (1816-2001), maritime (1900-2001), and river (1900-2001) claims from the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) project in the Western Hemisphere, Europe, and the Middle East. Empirical analysis suggests that international organizations are more likely to help disputing parties reach an agreement if they have more democratic members, if they are highly institutionalized, and when they use binding management techniques.

Commentary on the Special Issue

Snidal, D. — 2008-03-18

Commentary on the Special Issue

Milner, H. V. — 2008-03-18

Warlike Democracies

Ferejohn, J., McCall Rosenbluth, F. — 2008-01-16

Classical republican theories are monadic in the sense of seeing in each political regime a set of typical operating characteristics. There is disagreement as to what those characteristics are and specifically whether republican governments are more likely to be aggressive or peace loving. We group these two views as (democratic) mobilization theory versus (republican) checks theory and argue, first, that each can help us understand the finer structure of republican government; second, that they are not contradictory but can be combined in various ways in the same institutions; and third, that they offer the prospect of deepening our understanding of what is called the democratic peace proposition.

To Kill or to Protect: Security Forces, Domestic Institutions, and Genocide

Colaresi, M., Carey, S. C. — 2008-01-16

Contemporary studies of genocide have found military capabilities to be inconsistent predictors of state-sponsored killings. We suggest that these empirical inconsistencies stem from the fact that government strength can serve two opposing purposes. Some level of armed capabilities is necessary for a state to remain viable and to provide internal and external security. Yet armed government personnel can be deployed to repress and destroy segments of the public. We identify conditions under which an executive is more likely to use security forces for private-interest killing rather than public protection. We hypothesize that unconstrained leaders are more likely to use their putative security forces to initiate genocide and remain in power. An analysis of state failures that lead to genocide robustly supports the idea that the effect of increased security forces on the risk of genocide is conditional on institutional executive constraints.

A Tournament of Party Decision Rules

Fowler, J. H., Laver, M. — 2008-01-16

Following Axelrod's tournaments for strategies in the repeat-play prisoner's dilemma, we ran a ``tournament of party decision rules'' in a dynamic agent-based model of party competition. We asked researchers to submit rules for selecting party positions in a two-dimensional policy space, pitting each rule against all others in a suite of long-running simulations. The most successful rule combined a number of striking features: satisficing rather than maximizing in the short run, being ``parasitic'' on choices made by successful rules, and being hardwired not to attack other agents using the same rule. In a second suite of simulations in a more evolutionary setting in which the selection probability of a rule was a function of the previous success of agents using the same rule, the rule winning the original tournament pulled even further ahead of the competition.

Threat, Dehumanization, and Support for Retaliatory Aggressive Policies in Asymmetric Conflict

Maoz, I., McCauley, C. — 2008-01-16

Public opinion can permit or encourage retaliatory aggressive state policies against vulnerable but threatening out-groups. The authors present a model in which public support for such policies is determined by perceived threat from and dehumanization of the target group. This two-factor model predicts Israeli Jews' support for two retaliatory aggressive policies: the more hypothetical notion of Palestinian population transfer and concrete, coercive actions toward Palestinians. The authors find (1) that threat and dehumanization are distinct constructs, each having unique contributions to explaining support for aggressive retaliatory policies, (2) that threat and dehumanization significantly explain support for aggressive retaliatory policies when respondents' hawkishness, socioeconomic status (SES), and education level are taken into account, and (3) that the association of hawkishness and SES with support for aggressive retaliatory policies is largely mediated by threat perception. Results are highly consistent across two studies, suggesting the two-factor model may be useful for understanding support for aggressive action in situations of asymmetric conflict.

Bones of Contention: Comparing Territorial, Maritime, and River Issues

Hensel, P. R., McLaughlin Mitchell, S., Sowers, T. E., Thyne, C. L. — 2008-01-16

Contentious issues are important sources of militarized conflict. This article advances an issue-based approach to world politics, focusing on disagreements over territory, maritime zones, and cross-border rivers. We characterize militarized conflict and peaceful techniques as substitutable foreign policy tools that states can adopt to resolve disagreements over issues, and we present hypotheses to account for issue management based on issue salience and recent interaction over the same issue. Empirical analyses reveal that states are more likely to use both militarized conflict and peaceful methods when the issue at stake is more salient, both when the general issue type is considered more salient and when the specific issue under contention has greater within-issue salience. Recent issue management also plays an important role, as histories of both militarized conflict and failed peaceful settlements increase pressure to take further action to settle the issue.

Personal Functioning Under Stress: Accountability and Social Support of Israeli Leaders in the Yom Kippur War

Bar-Joseph, U., McDermott, R. — 2008-01-16

Much work has explored decision making under stress in political leadership. Less work has attempted to link the enormous emotional pressure of crisis with both the heightened sense of political accountability and responsibility and the increased need for social support under such circumstances. The authors examine the impact of political accountability, and the nature and quality of individual social support, on the relative performance of five central Israeli leaders on the second day of the Yom Kippur War. Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan and the Commander of the Southern Command, Maj. Gen. Shmuel Gonen, performed very poorly, whereas Prime Minister Golda Meir and Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. David Elazar performed very well. The Commander of the Northern Command, Maj. Gen. Yitzhak Hofi, performed adequately. The authors account for these divergences in performance based on individual differences in personal accountability and available social support networks.